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Abstract: Baruch Spinoza’s philosophy of mind stirs up the disputes about the nature 
of body-mind relations with its rigorous and naturalistic monism. The unity of body and mind 
is consequential of his metaphysics of the substance, but the concept of the unity of the mind 
and its idea rightfully confuses Spinoza’s commentators. Many have been tempted to interpret 
this as a possible account of consciousness, but it still has not yet been fully understood. This 
paper attempts to introduce an interpretation of the concept of ideas of ideas with regards 
to consciousness based on strict ontological monism, conceptual dualism, and self-similarity 
architecture, which concludes in distinguishing mental and psychic reality. While we might 
attribute mental reality, or mentality, to every extended thing, psychic reality is constituted 
by conscious ideas. And it seems to follow from Spinoza’s theory that the more ‘psychic’ 
the mind is, the more it knows God. 
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ČINNOST, PŘI KTERÉ MYSL NAHLÍŽÍ SEBE SAMU: SPINOZA O VĚDOMÍ 
Abstrakt: Filozofie mysli Barucha Spinozy svým rigorózním naturalistickým monismem 
podněcuje mnohé diskuze o povaze vztahu mysli a těla. Jednota mysli a těla je konsekventní 
jeho substanční metafyzice, avšak koncepce jednoty mysli a její ideje oprávněně mate 
Spinozovy komentátory. Mnozí z nich jsou nakloněni interpretovat tento koncept jako 
Spinozovu variaci na koncept (sebe)vědomí, přesto se však zdá, že jako takový ještě nebyl 
zcela adekvátně a celostně uchopen. Příspěvek představuje interpretaci konceptu idejí idejí 
v kontextu vědomí, přičemž metodologicky vychází z ontologického monismu, 
konceptuálního dualismu a sebe-opakující se architektury mysli a zahrnuje logické vyvození 
možné diferenciace mentální a psychické reality. Zatímco mentální realitu neboli mentalitu je 
možné na základě Spinozova učení připisovat každé rozprostraněné věci, psychická realita 
neboli psychika je konstituována vědomými idejemi. Ze Spinozova učení přitom také 
vyplývá, že čím více psychiky jednotlivá věc „má“, tím více poznává Boha. 
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Spinoza’s view of the body-mind relation opposes the dualistic tradition of explaining 
the psychophysical. The most crucial stance of his metaphysics of the psychophysical – there 
is no mind without the body, and no body without its mind – creates a strong monistic 
platform of understanding the nature of the mind and its relation to bodily existence. The 
so-called psychophysical parallelism, which seems consequential of his metaphysics of the 
substance, states that the body and the mind (always a particular body, and a particular mind) 
are one and the same thing, meaning an ontological unity of two different modal states of two 
different attributes of the substance. It seems unavoidable, then, to condition the study 
of Spinoza’s philosophy of mind with his metaphysics of the substance first. It also means 
that one needs to adapt paradigmatic fundamentals of Spinoza’s theory: rigorous naturalism, 
honest effort to understand human beings and human nature, and, most importantly, monistic 
and holistic vision of the universe.1 
The primary ontological status of every existing thing is inherence in the substance (E1def3)2, 
infinite and eternal (and identified with God). While being infinitely complex, i.e., with 
infinity of attributes, the substance as we know it expresses its essence as two attributes – 
the attribute of Extension and the attribute of Thought (EIIp2‒3). Every existing thing is thus 
‘in the image of God’ in the sense that it exists as a modification of his Extension, while also 
as a modification of his Thought. A human being, having an individual body as a modification 
of Extension, must also be an expression and modification of the substance’s Thought. The 
modifications of Thought are ideas; the modifications of Extension are extended things. And 
since a human body, as an extended thing, must also be an idea, it is precisely this idea of 
a specific human body in Thought that Spinoza calls ‘a mind’ (EIIp13). 
This psychophysical explanation has been termed as parallelism. However, Hynek Tippelt 
(2010) argues that it may be a misleading term since it suggests there are two existing series 
of events taking place independently of one another (Tippelt 2010, 61). It would probably be 
more accurate to think of it as of Spinoza’s version of dual-aspect theory, which simply 
understands material and mental planes of reality as aspects of one underlying reality. Harald 
Atmanspacher (2017) distinguishes two types of dual-aspect theories: compositional and 
decompositional. According to him, compositional theories claim that the compositional 
arrangements of psychophysically neutral elements decide their differences regarding 
the material or the mental; in other words, the structural composition of existing phaenomena 
determines whether they are material or mental. Decompositional theories, on the other hand, 
consider the material or the mental not reducible to one another, and see their differences 
emerging only when breaking the “holistic symmetry” by making distinctions (Atmanspacher 
2017, 307). I hold the view that Spinoza’s body-mind theory, as explicated in his Ethics, 
might be viewed as a decompositional type of dual-aspect thinking, since it does not allow for 
a ‘neutral domain’ in metaphysics. Every existing thing is granted its essential identity and 
unity by ontological determination of existence in the substance: “all things are from 
the necessity of the divine nature determined to exist and to act in a definite way” (EIp29). It 
is worth noting that taking a look at other, somewhat more recent decompositional 
metaphysical theories might clarify many confusing aspects of this approach – as also 
                                                          
1 By terming Spinoza’s system ‘monistic’ I address the unifying tendency of his metaphysics with regards 
to reality itself; by the term ‘holistic’ I understand the methods of interpreting the realities of things through their 
ontological and causal relations.  
2 When referring to Spinoza’s Ethics I use the system of abbreviations followed by numbers as adopted by many 
commentators: E(-thics, part of the book), p(-roposition), def(-inition), pf (proof), s(-cholium), cor(-rolary); so 
EIIp21s would refer to scholium to proposition 21 of second part of Ethics. All citations in this paper are from 
the English translation by Samuel Shirley, as part of the Complete Works edition (2002). In relevant places I also 
cite from the Latin version, Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata (1914). 
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suggested by Atmanspacher, other equally important predominant picture of this type of 
dual-aspect thinking was proposed by Carl Gustav Jung and Wolfgang Pauli (1955). 
If every existing thing in Extension must have a mental ‘counterpart’, then it seems correct 
to accuse Spinoza of panpsychism, as many of his commentators have (e.g. Bennett 1984; 
Jobani 2016; LeBuffe 2010; Miller 2007). However, I see panmentalism as a more fitting 
term, since Spinoza attributes mentality and mental processes to every existing thing, not 
a psychic reality, which may be something entirely different, as I shall demonstrate later 
in this paper. But what exactly is mentality; or, in other words, what does it mean for someone 
to ‘have a mind’? Through Spinoza’s optic, it is not accurate to think of the mind in terms 
of ‘having’ it. One does not ‘have a mind’, one is a mind, just as one does not ‘have a body’, 
but is a particular body. Just as all attributes of the substance express its fundamental 
singleness, oneness, and unity, so is this embodied mind – or thinking body – fundamentally 
one thing, conceivable through two different attributes (EIIIp2s).  
It follows that from a Spinozian view, when we experience ourselves and think of ourselves 
in terms of our minds, we perceive and know ourselves as ideas; when we experience 
ourselves and think of ourselves in terms of our bodies, we perceive and know ourselves as 
finite things in Extension. It needs to be emphasized that even though these reduced optics are 
both true partially (we are ideas and extended things), they are inadequate in relation 
to essential knowledge, because focusing on one or the other fails to observe their essential 
unity and identity. But what exactly is the nature – and where are the boundaries – of this 
‘embodied mind’? At first glance, it seems that the boundaries of the mind copy the 
boundaries of the body it is an idea of. And since the things that we perceive happen both in 
Extension and in Thought somehow simultaneously, everything that happens in the body must 
be perceived by the mind in some way.  
Peter Dalton (2002) considers this a serious problem: it seems to him that according to this 
account, one cannot have ideas other than the ideas of bodily states (Dalton 2002, 151). It is 
true that Spinoza’s account of affections seems to head this way. He defines affections as 
changes of bodily states and also ideas of these changes of bodily states in EIIIdef3. And 
since the human body and its states in Extension are the human mind and its ideas in Thought, 
there seems to be no place for any other ideas within the mind – as they would somehow cross 
the boundaries of the mind itself. As for the external bodies that we undoubtedly perceive, 
their ideas are not in our minds while we are perceiving them; as Spinoza claims in EIIp26, 
the mind does not perceive any external body except through the ideas of affections of its own 
body; that means that rather than perceiving the idea of a particular thing, we perceive our 
affections towards it.  
However, Spinoza’s philosophy does allow the existence of other ideas besides bodily states 
in the mind. The concept of idea of an idea, which he introduces in EIIp20 in relation to the 
idea of the human mind, has captured the attention of many commentators mostly because it 
may be considered as Spinoza’s take on the problem of consciousness.3 As Oberto Marrama 
(2017) has most recently presented, Spinoza confusingly uses Latin terms related to 
consciousness, i.e. conscientia and conscius esse, in many forms and meanings in Ethics, with 
the most explicit formal distinction being the use of the term conscientia in both cognitive and 
moral sense (conscience). It is thus hard to grasp the adequate meaning of the concept, even 
thought the mere use of it might signify its importance for Spinoza’s theory. After all, isn’t it 
impossible to grasp a complex understanding of the mind without it being conscious? 
                                                          
3 Some of the authors engaged with the question of consciousness in Spinoza’s philosophy attempted to see into 
whether Spinoza’s claims are compatible with findings and hypotheses of modern neurosciences. To reference 
some of their interesting works, see Damasio 2003, Höfer 2007, Nadler 2008, or Ravven 2003. 
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We can find Spinoza’s definition of the idea of an idea in EIIp21s: 
“For in fact the idea of the mind [idea Mentis] – that is, the idea of an idea [idea ideæ]– is 
nothing other than the form of the idea [forma ideæ] insofar as the idea is considered as a 
mode of thinking [modus cogitandi] without relation to its object”.  
Since this type of an idea is not an idea of a bodily state (which is identical with said state 
through ontological unity), but an idea of an idea of it, it is in no relation to one’s bodily state 
on an intellectual level. And an idea of the mind – which Spinoza also terms knowledge of the 
mind in EIIp23pf – is an idea of the mind as an idea: but not as an idea of a particular body. 
Hence, intellectually, these ideas are inadequate, which means that they lack understanding in 
a way that they are not additive to our adequate knowledge. In spite of this, Spinoza devoted 
much of his time and thought to this type of ideas, which may signify that even if these ideas 
as such do not help us much on our advised quest for blessedness, it might be useful to be 
aware of their nature and the mechanisms behind them. 
Antonio Damasio (2003) considers the idea of the mind to be an idea of the self, which is, as 
a second-order idea, inserted in the flow of ideas of bodily states in the mind, and thus 
produces the knowledge that one’s body is engaged in interacting with the object – the 
interacting itself being represented by bodily states and their ideas (Damasio 2003, 215). To 
him, the essence of consciousness is this “sense of self”, or idea of the mind, paired with 
fundamental cognitive processes (“movies-in-the-brain”) (Damasio 2003, 207). What if we 
attribute this ‘sense of self’ to every idea, and not just the complex idea of the mind itself? 
Can any idea in our minds have this ‘sense’? Christopher Martin (2007) believes that this is 
exactly what Spinoza was trying to point at: an idea of an idea means that an idea is being 
aware that it is an idea, or – that an affection is being conscious of itself as an idea. So when 
Spinoza writes of an idea of an affection, he actually claims that the affection is being 
self-conscious (Martin 2007, 277‒278).  
I believe that in Spinoza’s philosophy of mind, following Martin’s interpretation of ideas 
of ideas as conscious ideas, one can find an interesting and metaphysically sufficient account 
of a fractured consciousness – instead of an account of a complex consciousness. Humans can 
only be conscious to the extent ideas forming their minds are conscious. But what about the 
mysterious idea of the mind – does it imply that the mind as such can be conscious? Do 
conscious ideas somehow create conscious minds, or is it the other way around – in order to 
have a conscious idea, one’s mind must be conscious? In EIIp23pf, Spinoza clearly states that 
an idea of an idea must necessarily involve the idea of the mind which it inheres in. It could 
be said, then, that an idea of pain is formed in the mind by inadequate abstraction of actual, 
real pain (which itself is an idea), and inadequate grasping of one’s mind as an independent 
ideal being (‘my’ pain). So the mind can be termed conscious, as it involves an idea of self 
while having conscious ideas, but only then and to that extent. 
With no necessary precondition of being conscious for the mind to have conscious ideas, we 
should move forward to another level of reflecting this problem – the possibility of the 
existence of conscious ideas in other, non-human beings. As mentioned earlier in this paper, I 
believe Spinoza was an advocate of panmentalism, meaning that every existing extended 
thing is also a mind of some form. And since every mind consists of ideas, with every mind 
there is a possibility that at least one of its ideas might become conscious at some moment 
of its duration. But even when we accept that we might be sharing this phenomenon, we have 
to wonder why it manifests in other, non-human finite things to such small extent (at least 
from our point of view). Don Garrett (2008) explains this by identifying degrees 
of consciousness with the degrees of power of thinking, which is tied to one’s power 
concerning abilities for self-preservation. He holds that some individuals are “more powerful 
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self-preservers than others”, and that the more is the body capable of great many things, as is 
the idea of it (as Spinoza writes in EVp39s), the more conscious it is (Garrett 2008, 22‒23). It 
is, however, unclear, which criteria are supposed to effectively measure one’s abilities for 
self-preservation. Are my abilities for self-preservation greater than these abilities in, for 
example, Deinococcus radiodurans, the world’s toughest bacterium?4 I would not be certain 
enough to claim that they are. In addition, in terms of being able to self-preserve, this 
bacterium might actually be more conscious than any human. 
Another way to look at this problem may be through complexity-oriented approach, as 
proposed by Steven Nadler (2008), for example. Nadler correlates consciousness to a more 
complex body, and defines human consciousness as “the greater complexity of the human 
body as this is manifested under the attribute of Thought” (Nadler 2008, 591). The main 
objection against this optic is obvious – again, there is no clear and conclusive method for 
measuring the body’s complexity. Is it supposed to be mass-related, or rather about subtle 
complexities, such as highly sophisticated neural networks? The problem is that we just do 
not possess enough knowledge about matter and its true nature – because our ideas 
of extended things (including our own bodies) are inevitably confused and inadequate. 
However, even though our ideas of ideal things might be essentially inadequate as well, they 
are indisputably more adequate in relation to Thought and the activity of the mind. I believe, 
then, that the complexity-oriented approach is far more accurately used when used at first in 
relation to one’s mind, rather than one’s body. That means we need to conceptually divide the 
psychophysical unity and examine the mind in relation to the attribute of Thought only. So the 
question is: what makes the human mind more complex than other minds, as far as we do not 
think of the mind in terms of it being an expression of one’s body? 
It seems that the distinction between the minds that seem more conscious and the minds that 
seem less conscious lies only in either amount or intensity of conscious ideas that the minds 
involve. And to Spinoza, being conscious in such sense is closely tied to knowledge through 
the concept of intuition, by means of which we conceive all things through the idea of God as 
their cause (EVp32). He defines intuition in EIIp39s as proceeding from an adequate idea 
of the formal essence of some of God’s essential attributes (Extension and Thought) to an 
adequate understanding of the essences of particular things (i.e., modifications of Extension 
and Thought). And what are the formal essences of Extension and Thought? I believe that the 
essential form of Extension is nothing else than its ‘extension’, i.e., the constituting essence 
and order of the space itself. It follows that the essential form of Thought must be, as Hynek 
Tippelt (2010) names it, its ‘ideality’, or the fact that it is constituted by ideas and the order 
of the ideas (Tippelt 2010, 58). So to understand a particular thing through intuition, or 
conceive it through the idea of God as its cause, means to understand or adequately perceive 
its extension or ideality in the first place.  
How do we perceive the ideality of our ideas, or even the ideality of our minds? By 
perceiving them as ideas. That means, for example, perceiving our mental states as mental 
states, i.e., states originating in the mind, while also understanding their ‘place’ in particular 
order of the ideas.5 And as Christopher Martin reflects (2007), by perceiving its own mental 
states, the human mind perceives much more of the world – or, the substance (Martin 2007, 
                                                          
4 “An efficient system for repairing DNA is what makes the microbe so tough. High doses of radiation shatter 
the D. Radiodurans genome, but the organism stitches the fragments back together, sometimes in just a few 
hours. The repaired genome appears to be as good as new” (DeWeerdt 2002). 
5 As Spinoza claims in EIIp7 and EIIp7sch, the order and connection of the ideas is the same as the order and 
connection of things, and we must consider both orders of nature in relation to the corresponding attribute. That 
means that when conceiving an idea as an idea, to grasp a complex understanding of its ideal nature, one must 
conceive it at its place in the corresponding order of ideas.  
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282). Through perceiving itself as ideal, the mind understands more of the attribute 
of Thought, and thus it understands much more of God, even though it needs to be 
emphasized that we already know God in the sense that our bodies exist in Extension and we 
experience and consider them as extended things. But the more conscious ideas the mind 
involves, the more active it is in relation to Thought, which is, after all, the only manner in 
which the mind can be active at all.  
The complexity of one’s ‘consciousness’ thus addresses the amount and interconnectedness 
of conscious ideas. By having conscious ideas, the human mind ‘expands’ in a way that it is 
able to perceive inherential and inferential ideal relations, which inevitably determines the 
more complex knowledge of God in Spinoza’s philosophy. I believe that conscious ideas are 
closely tied to the concept of intuition, defined as a method of seizing things through the idea 
of God and adequate knowledge of formal essences of his attributes. According to Spinoza, 
intuitive knowledge leads to intellectual love of God (EVp35cor), and this love of God is, 
consequently, the love wherewith God loves himself, as he is everything. Later in EVp36pf, 
Spinoza writes: 
This mind’s love [Mentis Amor] must be related to the active nature of the mind, and is 
therefore an activity whereby the mind regards itself, accompanied by the idea of God as 
a cause [Mens se ipsam contemplatur, concomitante idea Dei tanquam causa]; that is, 
an activity whereby God, insofar as he can be explicated through the human mind, 
regards himself, accompanied by the idea of himself [seipsum contemplatur, 
concomitante idea sui]. And therefore this love of God is part of the infinite love 
wherewith God loves himself. 
For Spinoza, being conscious of one’s ideality – and by that, being conscious of God’s 
ideality – is fundamentally God, as expressed in his modifications, conscious of himself and 
his nature. However, it seems that God is only conscious of himself to the extent that the 
human mind – or any mind for that matter – conceives his nature as the cause of its conscious 
ideas. I believe that the consciousness of God must be understood in terms of his nature when 
considered in its finiteness (i.e., in regards to its particular modifications), rather than in 
relation to his infinite existence. In the particular act of involving a conscious idea, i.e., being 
conscious of oneself and of God, the human mind and God are to be perceived in a specific 
type of identical relation: God is being finitely conscious of himself (in his ideality) in the 
same way that the human mind is being finitely conscious of itself (in its ideality). I would not 
go as far as to say that the human mind is an instrument for the substance to become 
conscious, though, as I believe there is no ‘becoming’ regarding the substance. But, by 
contrast, the idea of God might ‘serve’ as an instrument for the human mind to become more 
perfect and being consciously ‘in the image of God’; as through this particular aspect 
of finiteness, the human mind gets a ‘glimpse’ of the infinity. Herman De Dijn (1996) notes 
that this understanding or love of God, which is also God’s love for himself, is part of God 
insofar as it constitutes his idea Dei; therefore, it is part of God’s intellect, which is not God 
as Natura naturans, but rather God as Natura naturata. That is why “our love can really be 
part of this love”, as De Dijn joyfully puts it (1996, 257). 
So far I have identified consciousness in Spinoza’s philosophy of mind as fractured 
consciousness, formed by individual or composite conscious ideas. On an epistemological 
level it is identified with the concept of intuitive knowledge, i.e., knowledge that seizes God’s 
nature as the cause of things and ideas. I believe that at this point it is necessary to distinguish 
between philosophy of body and philosophy of mind in Spinoza – while philosophy of body 
is concerned with the body’s extension and its ideality (e.g. affections), philosophy of mind 
should be concerned with the mind’s ideality primarily. I believe that the method 
of conceptual division according to the conceptual differences should be applied to all 
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of Spinoza’s philosophical ‘unities’: from God, the ultimate unity, through his conceptual 
division into attributes, modifications, and modifications of these modifications (states of the 
bodies and their ideas), to conscious and non-conscious modifications, or modifications that 
perceive themselves in relation to God’s essence, and modifications that do not. 
Modifications that do perceive themselves in relation to God’s essence understand that they 
really are related to him, and what a special relation it is. Consider the following propositions 
explicating the duration of the activity of the mind: 
EVp21: “The mind can exercise neither imagination nor memory save while the body 
endures”. 
 
EVp22: “Nevertheless, there is necessarily in God an idea which expresses the essence 
of this or that human body under a form of eternity”. 
 
EVp23: “The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed along with the body, but 
something of it remains, which is eternal”. 
In these propositions, Spinoza seemingly claims that every activity of the mind related to its 
body (imagination, memory) ends as soon as the body dies and an individual unity is 
destroyed by disintegration. However, since the essence of God constitutes the essences 
of things, and since God’s essence is eternal, there must be something of a particular essence 
of a thing that is also eternal in God. Spinoza terms this ‘something’ an idea. The expression 
‘under the form of eternity [sub specie aeternitatis]’ may be interpreted through the formal 
essences of God’s eternal attributes, which would mean that what is ‘left behind’ is the idea 
of the formal essence of the mind. As I proposed in this paper, the formal essence of the mind 
is its ideality, which means that the idea that expresses the ideality of the mind – which is 
undoubtedly the idea of the mind – could exist in God even when the body dies (or even 
before the body exists, as eternity is not time). Conscious ideas, then, form part of the mind 
that could be conceived under the form of eternity, and not through the optic of duration 
of the body; it is the reason, Spinoza speculates, why “we feel and experience that we are 
eternal” (EVp23sch). 
I mentioned above that the concept of mentality and the concept of psychic reality are not to 
be confused, as I believe in Spinoza’s philosophy there are satisfying accounts of both. 
Mentality, or mental reality, could be defined as processes and events that occur in the mind 
insofar as we understand it in relation to a particular object of Extension (the body). In 
contrast, psychic reality would be processes and events that occur in the mind insofar as we 
understand it in relation to the mind itself. I believe it follows from Spinoza’s philosophy that 
while mentality constitutes the primordial form of consciousness, granting the ideas that are 
conscious, psychic reality is constituted by consciousness. This reality constituted by human 
consciousness could be seen as a product of complex ‘virtual reflection’, which is a concept 
brought up by Steven Nadler (2008). According to him, the ideas-of-ideas doctrine does not 
state that every idea is an object of some distinct, second-order idea directed at the first (such 
as in Damasio 2003); rather, it describes an intrinsic self-reflexivity of every idea, which is 
guaranteed in God (Nadler 2008, 582-583). Thus, we may understand psychic reality as a 
product of mentality (ideas to be conscious of) and intrinsic mental self-reflexivity, the latter 
being immediately caused by the formal essence of God’s Thought, or, ideas and the order 
of ideas. 
9 
 
 
 
I have attempted to capture Spinoza’s body-mind-consciousness solution according to this 
interpretation in graphic form (picture above), which, I hope, might help to understand some 
of its basic propositions together with more complicated claims. The individual reality of the 
body and the mind is the basis for this model. Them being in the same position (horizontally) 
signifies that the body and the mind are ontologically one (expressing the unity of the 
substance’s essence). The dash line between them (vertically) indicates that they are 
conceptually distinct. The same holds for affection of the body and the idea of this affection, 
both of which are modifications of this individual unity – they are ontologically one, but 
conceptually two things; and this applies to Extension and Thought in the first place. The 
‘horizontality’ and ‘verticality’ of attributes, modifications, and modifications 
of modifications proceed directly and immediately from God’s essence, which itself is 
conceptually (and only conceptually) distinct. 
The mind and its idea are in an identical relation, too; however this identity is not ontological 
(or substantial) but rather modal, since it expresses the unity of the mode but not the unity 
of the substance. An idea of the mind is ‘the mind’ inside of the mind, so it inheres in the 
mind, while the mind does not inhere in the body, nor the body inheres in Extension. The idea 
of an idea of affection of the body is part of ‘the mind’ in the same way that an idea 
of affection of the body is part of the mind. That means that the idea of an idea of affection is 
in identical modal relation to its mental state as well, hence the ‘verticality’ of it. As indicated 
by the dash line, they are conceptually distinct; we conceive the idea of affection in relation to 
the body, while the idea of this idea solely in relation to the mind. This distinction, however, 
is horizontal rather than vertical, because it only distinguishes the mode from itself, not from 
a mode of a different attribute. 
In Jonathan Bennett’s (1984) view, the ideas-of-ideas doctrine indicates that the aspect 
of self-knowledge precedes the aspect of consciousness in the sense that there is a “basic store 
of self-knowledge” of ideas that may be conscious at some time (Bennett 1984, 188). This 
may be interpreted as unconscious knowledge, which I agree may form a greater part of the 
human mind. The popular interpretation of Gilles Deleuze (1988) considers consciousness as 
“completely immersed in the unconscious”, because we are mostly conscious of ideas of our 
affections, i.e., inadequate ideas that we do not understand the origin of. However, he also 
concludes that by attaining adequate ideas, consciousness becomes their reflection, which is 
tied with intellectual power of overcoming our fallacies and illusions (1988, 59‒60).  
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I think that placing such importance on distinguishing between conscious and unconscious 
ideas in terms of their intellectual evaluation might not be the most elucidatory way to help 
with understanding their relation. I favor interpretations that emphasize the modal identity of 
the conscious and the unconscious, as in Hynek Tippelt’s (2015) interpretation of Lou 
Andreas-Salomé’s view. Through this optic, psychic processes are constantly moving on the 
scale of absolute unconsciousness to clearest consciousness. It suggests that there are no clear 
distinctions between conscious and unconscious ideas, since they are the same idea, or same 
part of the same order of ideas. Conceptually, and solely at the level of psychic reality, 
psychic data are distinguished by degree of availability for conscious realization. The fact that 
every idea that becomes self-conscious is actually conscious of its mentality (or ideality) does 
not imply that every idea has the same potential for self-realization. This potential might 
depend, for example, on a certain complexity of such idea’s object’s connections and causal 
relations (Nadler’s method). 
Consciousness – as in conscious ideas – constitutes psychic reality that we, human beings, 
live in. The human mind is generally regarded as conscious to a great extent, because in 
humans, the idea of the mind is somewhat ‘integrated’ in the mind; ‘integrated’ in the sense 
of constantly inhering within the structure of the mind. We are not born this way; as Spinoza 
reminds us in EVp39s, children have minds which have practically no consciousness 
of themselves, of God, and of things, and we should concern ourselves with helping them to 
evolve to more capable bodies and minds, which are more conscious of themselves etc. The 
complexity of consciousness of a human being is thus relative in respect to the evolving (or 
devolving) complexity of its modes. In terms of complexity, it should be also emphasized that 
for Spinoza, more complex consciousness translates into more complex state of moral 
development. 
The final question I see as emerging regarding the problem of consciousness is, to what extent 
is it real – in other words, what sort of metaphysical reality is this psychic reality? It has 
already been implied that conscious ideas, as part of God’s intellect, are part of Natura 
naturata, but what I consider as more important is that in contrast to bodies and ideas, Natura 
naturata is also their origin. While the original modifications proceed directly from God’s 
Natura naturans, conscious ideas are modifications directly caused by modifications 
themselves – or other modifications. I agree with Deleuze that this is the moment of birth 
of many of our philosophical illusions (the illusion of agency, will, freedom of will), but in its 
positive dimension it can also be a moment when at least parts of us are truly self-
determining. And regarding my final question, it seems to me that our modal realities are to 
be considered just as real as anything else in the substance. Whether they’re adequate or 
inadequate, they exist; and they also provide us with the possibility of taking the likeness to 
the substance in the sense of being a ‘focal point’ to which we relate everything else. And 
even though having our own subjective perspective might move us away from the true nature 
of reality (and God), it is what makes us ‘us’; it constitutes and determines the nature of our 
own existence, which I believe is perfectly real.  
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